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Abstract—In psychology and neuroscience it is common to de-
scribe cognitive systems as input/output devices where perceptual
and motor functions are implemented in a purely feedforward,
open-loop fashion. On this view, perception and action are often
seen as encapsulated modules with limited interaction between
them. While embodied and enactive approaches to cognitive
science have challenged the idealisation of the brain as an
input/output device, we argue that even the more recent attempts
to model systems using closed-loop architectures still heavily rely
on a strong separation between motor and perceptual functions.
Previously, we have suggested that the mainstream notion of
modularity strongly resonates with the separation principle of
control theory. In this work we present a minimal model of a
sensorimotor loop implementing an architecture based on the
separation principle. We link this to popular formulations of
perception and action in the cognitive sciences, and show its
limitations when, for instance, external forces are not modelled
by an agent. These forces can be seen as variables that an
agent cannot directly control, i.e., a perturbation from the
environment or an interference caused by other agents. As an
alternative approach inspired by embodied cognitive science, we
then propose a nonmodular architecture based on the active
inference framework. We demonstrate the robustness of this
architecture to unknown external inputs and show that the
mechanism with which this is achieved in linear models is
equivalent to integral control.
Index Terms—modularity, separation principle, active infer-
ence, Bayesian inference, optimal control
I. INTRODUCTION
In cognitive science it is often assumed that agents can be
described as input/output systems, an idea based on traditional,
computational accounts of cognition [1]–[3]. In these models,
the emphasis is on internal models of the world, central
processing and the sense-model-plan-act framework, often
neglecting embodiment, situatedness and feedback from the
environment [4]. More recent attempts, e.g., [5]–[7], have
proposed closed-loop descriptions of cognitive system using
internal forward/inverse models in an attempt to provide better
accounts of behaviour in living organisms. However in both
the input/output and the closed-loop architectures advocated by
these approaches, the role of perceptual and motor processes is
thought to be fundamentally modular [2], i.e., these functions
can be described as nearly independent, (informationally)
encapsulated components with minimal interactions.
In recent years, theories of estimation and control have
become increasingly popular accounts of perception [8]–[10]
and action [5]–[7] respectively. In this context, the Kalman-
Bucy filter is used as a model of perception [9], [11] while
LQR (linear quadratic regulator) constitutes the basis of var-
ious accounts of motor control [12], [13]. In previous work
[14] we claimed that the idea of modularity of action and
perception can be seen as an analogy of the separation prin-
ciple in control theory [15]–[17]. According to this principle,
problems of estimation and control of a system can be solved
separately and their solutions can be optimally combined under
a set of assumptions. Following this, one can sequentially
combine a Kalman-Bucy filter and LQR to create the LQG
(linear quadratic Gaussian) architecture, used as a general
methodology for several models of sensorimotor loops, e.g.,
[6], [13], [18], [19]. The “classical sandwich” [3] of cognitive
science thus survives, we claim, even in the forward/inverse
models formulation of perception and motor control.
The fields of embodied and enactive cognitive science on the
other hand emphasise the deep integration of perception and
action, seen as fundamentally intertwined [20]–[22]. In [14]
we proposed to use a framework based on the formulation
of perception and action as estimation and control while not
implementing the conditions for the separation principle, i.e.,
active inference. Active inference is a process theory based on
the free energy principle [23] describing cognitive functions
(perception and action, but also learning and attention) as
processes of minimisation of sensory surprisal [23], [24]. More
precisely, since this quantity is not directly accessible by
an agent, it is thought that the variational free energy (an
upper bound to sensory surprisal) is minimised in its place.
In active inference, perceptual and motor processes are often
described as entangled and inseparable [25]–[27] providing
thus a new possible methodology combining estimation and
control following embodied/enactive theories of the mind. We
previously presented a conceptual account of active inference
and its role for nonmodular architectures of cognitive systems
[14]. Here we introduce a minimal agent model highlighting
the different implementations (LQG vs. active inference) es-
pecially in presence of unknown external stimuli affecting an
agent’s observations.
II. LQG AND THE SEPARATION PRINCIPLE
The framework provided by LQG control and based on
the separation principle linearly combines two processes of 1)
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estimation or inference of hidden properties of the environment
and 2) control or regulations of variables of interest. The
estimation of hidden variables is based on the presence of
a Kalman (for discrete time systems) or Kalman-Bucy (for
continuous time systems) filter, while the control of the desired
variables on LQR [15]–[17]. In particular, this combination is
provably optimal according to a set of assumptions:
1) the estimator is implemented through a state-space
model where only linear process dynamics and observa-
tion laws describe the environment and its latent states
2) uncertainty or noise in both dynamics and observations
are represented by white, zero-mean Gaussian variables
3) the properties of these random variables, in particular
their (co)variance matrices, are known
4) the performance of the regulator can be evaluated using
a quadratic cost function
5) all the inputs/forces applied to the agent are known, e.g.,
external disturbances and internal signals such as motor
actions.
Following the separation principle, the LQG controller
produces optimal estimation and optimal control for linear
systems, sequentially combining two separate sub-systems, a
Kalman-Bucy filter and LQR, in an optimal (i.e., minimum-
variance) way [16], [17]. The Kalman-Bucy filter provides the
optimal state-estimate of a signal and the LQR controller uses
such estimate (i.e., the mean) to implement the optimal deter-
ministic controller: LQG control makes use of the estimated
mean and feeds it into an LQR controller.
A general linear system to be regulated in the presence of
noise on the observed state is described by:
dx = Ax dt+Ba dt+ dw y = Cx+ dz (1)
where all the variables and parameters are the same as pre-
viously defined for Kalman-Bucy filters and LQR. Using the
separation principle, it can then be shown that minimising the
expected value of the cost-to-go is equivalent to minimising
the cost-to-go for the expected (estimated) state [17]
c(x,a) = c(xˆ,a) =
1
2
xˆTQxˆ+
1
2
aTRa (2)
where we replaced states x with their estimates xˆ, meaning
that the optimal control can be computed using only the
state estimate (i.e., the mean) xˆ rather than x. The combined
problem of estimation and control in LQG terms is then
implemented by the following system combining Kalman-
Bucy filter and LQR equations:
˙ˆx =Axˆ+Ba+K(y − Cxˆ)
a =− Lxˆ
K =PHT (Σz)
−1
L =R−1BTV
P˙ =Σw +AP + PA
T −K(Σz)KT
−V˙ =Q+ATV + V A− LTRL. (3)
III. ACTIVE INFERENCE
Active inference is a process theory proposed to explain
brain functioning and other functions of living systems based
on Bayesian inference and optimal control theory [23], [24],
[28]. In this section we establish its relations to the LQG
architecture, starting by building an active inference version of
the regulation of a linear multivariate system, and highlighting
differences, limitations and possible extensions proposed for
the control problem. As with LQG control, we build an
estimator of the hidden states x. In this case however, we
will give a variational account of the estimator in generalised
coordinates of motion that generalises the MLE/MAP deriva-
tion of Kalman-Bucy filters [29] using Variational Bayes with
a Laplace approximation [24], [30]. We start by defining a
generative model for an agent capturing the dynamics of the
system to control and how these relate to observations and
represented in a generalised state-space form [24], [31]:
x′ = Aˆx′ + Bˆv +w y = Cˆx+ z (4)
where the hat over the matrices simply represents the fact that
the matrices used in the generative model don’t necessarily
mirror their counterparts describing the world dynamics ( [32],
[33]), as shown in our model later. The main difference with
respect to LQG however is that LQG explicitly mirrors (by
construction in the linear case) the dynamics of the observed
system, thus including knowledge of inputs a. On the other
hand, in active inference this vector is not explicitly modelled
by an agent, assuming that such information is not available to
a system, in accordance with evidence in motor neuroscience
suggesting the lack of knowledge of self-produced controls
(i.e., efference copy) [25], [34], [35]. It is in fact proposed
that a deeper duality of estimation and control exists whereby,
in the simplest case (i.e., a purely reflexive account), actions
are simply responses to the presence of prediction errors at the
proprioceptive level, irrespectively of the cause of sensations
(self-generated or external forces) [25], [33]. The vector v in
the generative model encodes instead external or exogenous
inputs in a state-space models context or, from a Bayesian
perspective, priors or “desired” outcomes generated by higher
layers in hierarchical (Bayesian) implementations [10], [31].
In this light, priors can be used to effectively bias the estimator
to “infer” desired rather than observed states, with a controller
instantiating actions on the world to fulfil the “observed” (=
desired) states of an agent. Variables z,w model the real noise
in the environment making, however, use of the definition of
state space models in generalised coordinates of motion [30],
[31], where z, w are treated as analytical noise with non-zero
autocorrelation, generalising the definition of Wiener processes
with Markov property.
This state-space model can then be written down in a
probabilistic form, mapping the measurements equation to a
likelihood P (y|xˆ) (no direct influence of inputs on observa-
tions), and a the dynamics to a prior P (xˆ,v) [24], [31], [32].
The two multivariate Gaussian probabilities densities can then
be combined and used in the general formulation of Laplace
encoded variational free energy defined in [24], [30] (without
constants):
F ≈ − lnP (y,x,v)
∣∣∣
x=µx,v=µv
(5)
the free energy for a generic linear multivariate system be-
comes then:
F ≈ 1
2
[(
y − Cˆµx
)T
Πz
(
y − Cˆµx
)
+
+
(
µ′x − Aˆµˆx − Bˆµv
)T
Πw
(
µ′x − Aˆµx − Bˆµv
)
+
− ln ∣∣Πz∣∣− ln ∣∣Πw∣∣+ (m+ n) ln 2pi] (6)
where we explicitly replaced x,v with their expectations
µx,µv since under the Laplace assumption this represents
the best estimate of x,v (i.e., covariances of the approximate,
variational density can be recovered analytically [24], [30]).
Variables m,n represent the length of vectors y and x
respectively. Expectations µx play the same role of estimates
xˆ in LQG, we simply decided to use a notation consistent
with some of our previous work [24], [32], [36]. We also
defined precision matrices Πz,Πw as the inverse of covariance
matrices Σz,Σw and used | · | to define the determinant of
a matrix. It is important to highlight that, in general, the
covariance matrices used in the generative model can be
different from the ones used to describe the environment or
generative process [32], [33]. To simplify the already heavy
notation we will however represent them in the same way.
The recognition dynamics, encoding perception and action
in a system minimising free energy [24], [30] and equivalent
to estimation and control functions respectively, are imple-
mented in standard active inference formulations as a gradient
descent scheme minimising the free energy with respect to the
variables µx for perception/estimation:
µ˙x = Dµx − ∂F
∂µx
= µ′x + Cˆ
TΠz
(
y − Cˆµx
)
+
+ AˆTΠw
(
µ′x − Aˆµx − Bˆµv
)
µ˙′x = Dµ
′
x −
∂F
∂µ′x
= µ′′x −Πw
(
µ′x − Aˆµx − Bˆµv
)
(7)
and actions a for action/control, assuming only that actions
have an effect on observations y [28]:
a˙ = −∂F
∂a
= −∂F
∂y
∂y
∂a
= −∂y
∂a
T
Πz
(
y − Cˆµx
)
. (8)
The estimation expressed in (7) prescribes a generalisation of
Kalman-Bucy filters to trajectories with arbitrary embedding
orders where random variables are not treated as Markov
processes [30]. In (7), we also include an extra term Dµx
that represents the “mode of the motion” (also the mean
for Gaussian variables) for the minimisation in generalised
coordinates of motion [24], [31], with D as a differential
operator shifting the order of motion, i.e., Dµx = µ′x. More
intuitively, since we are now minimising the components of a
generalised state representing a trajectory rather than a static
variable, variables are in a moving framework of reference
where the minimisation is achieved for µ˙x = µ′x rather than
µ˙x = 0. Action as expressed in (8) may appear similar to
the traditional LQR/LQG form, but is fundamentally different
since it depends explicitly on observations y rather than
estimated hidden states µx.
IV. THE MODEL
The double integrator is a canonical example used in control
theory and represents one of the most fundamental problems
in optimal control, modelling single degree of freedom motion
of different physical systems [37], [38]. In the case presented
here, this could be thought of as a block on frictionless surface.
In motor neuroscience, this is the simplest model of single-
joint movement [39] and can, in some cases, be easily gener-
alised to multiple degrees of freedom [28]. The standard dou-
ble integrator is usually described as a deterministic system.
The control policy is thus defined using a feedback law applied
directly to the known dynamics, as the full state of the system
is measured with no uncertainty [37]. For the purposes of this
work, where uncertainty and noise are crucial components,
we will introduce process and measurement noise into the
system, making the estimation of hidden states necessary. This
will then allow us to compare LQG and active inference in
one of the simplest possible examples in the control theory
literature with direct applications to the study of motor systems
and behaviour 1. The double integrator is described by the
following state-space model:
x˙ = Ax+Ba+w y = Cx+ z (9)
where matrices A,B,C are defined as:
A =
[
0 1
0 0
]
B =
[
0 0
0 1
]
C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
and covariance matrices Σz,Σw as:
Σz =
[
exp(0) 0
0 exp(0)
]
Σw =
[
0 0
0 exp(−1)
]
A. The LQG solution to the double integrator
For LQG we implement (3) using the same matrices
A,B,C,Σz,Σw specified above and furthermore define:
Q =
[
1 0
0 1
]
R =
[
4 0
0 4
]
(10)
with no specific optimisation of these parameters since it is
beyond the scope of this work. For further analysis see for
instance [37]. As we can see in Fig. 2a, the block is effectively
driven to the desired position x = 0 and velocity x′ = 0
from a set of 5 randomly initialised conditions (position and
velocity are sampled from zero-mean Gaussian distributions,
sd=300). In Fig. 2b we then show the actions over time of
the same 5 example agents, all converging to zero since the
agents effectively reach their desired target. The main feature
of LQG, and from which active inference will depart, is the
1The code is available at https://github.com/mbaltieri/doubleIntegrator
m =1kg
Sliding block on a frictionless surface,

target: x = 0, x’ = 0
x = 0
Force

applied
Fig. 1: The generative process, a double integrator. The
double integrator models the motion of a system with a single
degree of freedom, corresponding to a block of mass=1kg
placed on a surface with no friction. The block is initialised at
a random position with a random velocity and needs to stop,
x′ = 0, at position x = 0.
reliability of estimates of both position and velocity (the red
line in the phase space), using a Kalman-Bucy filter. In LQG,
accurate estimates are necessary to then enact the LQR com-
ponent implementing a negative feedback mechanism based
on estimates xˆ rather than true hidden states x. In Fig. 3 we
introduced a new external force not modelled by the agents,
equivalent to a disturbance from the environment (black line in
Fig. 3b). Fig. 3a then shows that the agents are incapable of
regulating their position/velocity against this unknown input
(blue lines), after an initial convergence towards the desired
state, they in fact move away from it when the unexpected
force is introduced. Furthermore, these agents are incapable
of correctly inferring their trajectories, providing inaccurate
estimates of their sensed variables (red lines). In Fig. 3b we
see that all of these agents attempt to counteract the effects of
unexpected stimuli (they minimise their velocity after the force
is introduced), however the lack of an appropriate mechanism
to track their position correctly (e.g., integral action) pushes
them away from the target.
B. The double integrator with active inference
To solve the same control problem, active inference relies
on the generation of predictions of proprioceptive sensations
(position, velocity as in LQG, and also acceleration in this
case), followed by the implementation of actions in the world
via (trivial) reflex arcs. The proprioceptive modality is es-
sentially treated as other inputs (vision, audition, etc.) and
estimates/predictions are generated using the same generative
model taking advantage of incoming proprioceptive sensations.
This produces a considerably different control system, with
state estimates and actions now created by the same model,
making it hard to clearly separate processes of perception
and action. The copy of motor control signals (cf. efference
copy [40]), necessary in standard LQG settings to meet the
observability constraints of Kalman-Bucy filters [16], [17] is
Target
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Time (s)
75
50
25
0
25
50
75
100
Ac
tio
n,
 a
 (m
/s
2 )
Action of double integrator - LQG
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
(b)
Fig. 2: The double integrator solved using LQG. (a) Five
examples with different initial conditions showing in blue the
observed trajectories of different blocks in the phase-space
and in red the agent’s estimates of the same trajectories. (b)
Actions taken by the five agents.
not included in this formulation, as explained in section III.
Active inference postulates in fact that direct representations
of the causes or actions a of self-generated sensations need not
be discounted during the prediction of new incoming sensory
inputs. This could be seen as a limitation of active inference,
but in general this speaks to the robustness of this approach
in face of unknown inputs (i.e., motor actions produced by
an agent or exogenous forces from the environment), see
[36]. In this framework, inputs can also be estimated using
an appropriate generative model of the world dynamics [30],
a feature thought to be fundamental in biological systems
[41]. Simple and effective approximations are also possible,
for example with integral control, thought to be the most
basic heuristic dealing with the problem of uncertain inputs
in biological systems down to the unicellular level [41], [42]
and already shown to be consistent with formulations of active
Target
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2 )
Action of double integrator - LQG, no external force in KBF
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Ext. force
(b)
Fig. 3: The double integrator solved using LQG. (a) Five
examples with different initial conditions showing in blue the
observed trajectories of different blocks in the phase-space
and in red the agent’s estimates of the same trajectories. (b)
Actions taken by the five agents after an external force is
introduced (black line).
inference [36].
To derive an active inference solution to the double integra-
tor, we start by defining a generative model for the agent, i.e.,
the block:
x′ = Aˆx+ Bˆv +w y = Cˆx+ z (11)
where matrix Aˆ is:
Aˆ =
 0 1 0−α1 −α2 0
0 0 0

while Bˆ is diagonal with exp(1) values, Cˆ is zero everywhere
but in C2,2 where the motor action is applied (with a value
of 1) and covariance matrices Σz,Σw are also diagonal with,
respectively, exp(1) and exp(8) values on the main diagonals.
m =1kg
Spring-mass-damper system
−α1x
−α2x′  
x = 0
Fig. 4: The generative model. To implement the regulation of
position and velocity, the agent implements a model whereby
an imaginary spring pulls the block back to the origin (x = 0)
while an imaginary damper slows it down (x′ = 0).
The agent implements beliefs of a world where it is pulled
back to the desired state x = x′ = 0 by an imaginary spring
and slows down thanks to an imaginary piston-like damper,
“designed” (in this case by us, but more in general one could
imagine evolutionary processes for biological system [28]) to
favour normative behaviour.
Following (6), the variational free energy for our controller
is then described by:
F ≈ 1
2
[
piz(y − µx)2 + piz′(y′ − µ′x)2 + piz′′(y′′ − µ′′x)2+
+ piw′(µ
′′
x − µv)2 − ln(pizpiz′piz′′piw′) + (3 + 2) ln 2pi
]
(12)
where precisions pi are taken from the diagonals of precision
matrices Πz,Πw (inverse covariances matrices Σz,Σw defined
in the generative model). After explicitly writing out the
equations derived from the matrix formulation in (7), we get
the following formulation of perceptual inference:
µ˙x =µ
′
x + piz(y − µx) + piw(µ′x + αµx − βµv)
µ˙′x =µ
′′
x + piz′(y
′ − µ′x) + piw′(µ′′x + αµ′x − βµ′v)
µ˙′′x =µ
′′′
x + piz′′(y
′′ − µ′′x) + piw′′(µ′′x + αµ′x − βµ′v) (13)
and
µ˙′x =− piw(µ′x + αµx − βµv)
µ˙′′x =− piw′(µ′′x + αµ′x − βµ′v) (14)
showing the lack of the Kalman gain K and an important
difference derived from its absence: if K is non-diagonal as
in this case (one can simply verify this claim with standard
functions solving continuous Riccati equations, as in the
provided code), both orders of motion are present in the
optimal filter problem in (3), but only one appears in (13)
since the precision matrices are assumed to be diagonal in our
formulation. More in general, in active inference the Kalman
gain K matrix is replaced by learning rates such as in this work
or [32], or by clever implementations that allow for adaptive
update schemes with varying integration steps as in [30].
The action component is, however, the one most signif-
icantly different, starting from the assumption that direct
knowledge of motor signals is not available and thus not
modelled in the generative model (motor commands a are
replaced by inputs v acting as priors). This entails a new
approach to the problem, with active inference suggesting that
the only information needed comes from observations y, see
(8). On this account, action reduces to
a˙ = −
(
∂y′
∂a
)T
Πz(y − Cˆµx) (15)
and with the assumption that
∂y
∂a
=
[
1 1 1
]T
the explicit, scalar version of action becomes
a˙ = −piz(y − µx)− piz′(y′ − µ′x)− piz′′(y′′ − µ′′x), (16)
replacing the LQR component in (3). This type of control
is equivalent to a PID controller, and is the “optimal” linear
solution when knowledge of inputs a is not available in the
generative model [36]. As in the case of filtering, the feedback
gain L is missing in the active inference formulation, once
again replaced by learning rates of the gradient descent or
by other approximations. In Fig. 5 we can see an example
implementation of the double integrator using active inference.
Five agents are initialised at random position and velocity
(zero-mean Gaussian distributed, sd=300) and converge to
the target solution where the output actions are essentially
zero (excluding some noise), as expected Fig. 5b. The most
striking feature is that estimates of both position and velocity
of the block are very inaccurate but the agent nonetheless
reaches the desired target in the phase space, Fig. 5a. These
differences are given by the generative implemented by the
agent, encoding an imaginary spring-damper system that pulls
it towards its desired state Fig. 4. Fig. 6 shows the robustness
of this implementation when an external force is introduced:
by implementing integral control [36], active inference can
in this case counteract the effects of unexpected inputs. The
presence of integral action perfectly counteracts the effects
of disturbances Fig. 6b (cf. Fig. 3b), and more importantly
allows for the desired regulation of the agents’ positions,
Fig. 6a, which is impossible in LQG accounts assuming perfect
knowledge of the world (cf. Fig. 3a).
V. DISCUSSION
LQG-based architectures are modular in nature, with per-
ception and action seen as separate problems solved nearly
independently. According to this view, a system should ini-
tially find accurate estimates of the hidden properties of
its observations, and only once such estimates are available
should an agent attempt to regulate variables that are of
interest to achieve its goals, e.g., temperature, oxygen level,
etc.. On the other hand, we can define a framework based
Target
(a)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Time (s)
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Action of double integrator - Active inference
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
(b)
Fig. 5: The double integrator solved using active inference
(α1 = exp (2), α2 = exp (1)). Same layout as Fig. 2. (a)
Five examples with different initial conditions showing in blue
the observed trajectories of different blocks in the phase-space
and in red the agent’s estimates of the same trajectories. (b)
Actions taken by the five agents.
on mathematical formulations of control problems where the
separation principle is not included or required. According to
one such proposal, that we identified in active inference [23],
[28], perception and action are combined in an inseparable
sensorimotor loop described by the minimisation of variational
free energy for an agent. In this set up, action and perception
are seen as instances of a fundamentally unique process [20],
using different labels for our (i.e., the observers’) convenience.
In particular, the idea of precise inferences of world variables
is called into question [32], [43], to the point that inaccurate
perception is not only possible but becomes a pre-requisite
to act on the world [26], [33]. In architectures based on
the separation principle, the estimated state of a system is
thought of as a relevant account of real observations, e.g.,
their means and covariances. Conversely, in active inference it
Target
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200
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Action of double integrator - Active inference
Agent 1
Agent 2
Agent 3
Agent 4
Agent 5
Ext. force
(b)
Fig. 6: The double integrator solved using active inference
(α1 = exp (2), α2 = exp (1)). Same layout as Fig. 2. (a)
Five examples with different initial conditions showing in blue
the observed trajectories of different blocks in the phase-space
and in red the agent’s estimates of the same trajectories. (b)
Actions taken by the five agents after an external force is
introduced (black line).
becomes clear that estimates of latent variables of the world
are deeply connected to the current goal of an agent, e.g., to
regulate its observations, cf. [44]. To do so, its targets are
encoded as prior expectations and used to bias inferential
processes toward its desires so that prediction errors are
created as the mismatch of observations and the estimates of
hidden variables. These errors are then minimised by acting on
the world [28], taking advantage of proprioceptive prediction
errors that enact reflex arcs to make observation better accord
with existing predictions [26], [45]. More in general, the active
inference formulation allows also for accurate estimates of
the latent variables generating observations, see for instance
[30], but this modality fundamentally excludes the possibility
of acting: if no prediction errors are generated for action to
minimise, an agent becomes a simple mirror of its world with
no strong desire or even necessity to act [32], [33], [46].
In other words, depending on different precision weights an
agent can accurately estimate its observations without acting
or potentially discard its sensations to only pursue its desires,
generating all possible cases in between as a balanced mix of
weighted prediction errors [47].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years the more traditional understanding of per-
ceptual and motor as nearly independent processes as been put
into discussion by different authors, especially in neuroscience
[48]–[50]. It is clear that many experimental set ups are limited
[51], requiring new and ethologically meaningful paradigms
for an appropriate study of different aspects of living systems
[52]. In this context, we propose some new ideas that could
drive future experiments. These ideas are centred around a
critical appraisal of LQG as a model architecture for cognitive
systems, focusing in particular on the assumptions made by
the use of Kalman-Bucy filters, central to these proposals [11],
[18], [53]. One of the key requirements for Kalman-Bucy
filters to generate an accurate estimate of the hidden state of a
system is to have access to all the outputs (the observations)
and all the inputs (forces that affect the state) of a system. The
inputs, in particular, include both motor commands, which in
classical forward/inverse models are identified using the idea
of efference copy [40] (see for instance [5]–[7]), and external
forces/signals from the environment that cannot be in principle
accounted by an organism, i.e., a sudden change in weather
conditions or unexpected interactions with other agents.
In this work we focused on the latter, since the presence
of external unaccounted forces is often overlooked in many
experimental set-ups with fixed or predictable conditions (e.g.,
the classic and still dominating two-alternative forced choice
paradigm). In more realistic and ethological scenarios, how-
ever, one should expect that external and unpredictable stimuli
constantly affect the behaviour of an agent [50]–[52]. In this
case, introducing noise or varying experimental conditions
may help in testing the robustness of LQG-based architectures.
In practice, if some inputs are not known, one should expect
LQG to perform rather poorly until these inputs can be
estimated and adaptation (e.g., learning) to new conditions
can take place. However, one should then explain how such
forces can be described in LQG since Kalman-Bucy filters
cannot estimate inputs [29] (cf. DEM [30]). More in general,
if a system is well adapted to deal with unpredictable stimuli,
simple mechanisms such as integral control could be in place,
as shown formally in [41] and in experiments on chemotactic
adaptation in E. Coli [42] for instance. More recently, some
promising results have been presented in [54], supporting
the idea that integral feedback control, unlike Kalman(-Bucy)
filters, is a good model for adaptation in environments with
varying conditions. Integral control constitutes a linear ap-
proximation to problems of control with unknown forces
affecting the observations of an agent [36], [38], providing a
robust solution with fast responses to problems that otherwise
would require slower learning mechanisms [42], which may
be ineffective in fast-paced environments [55].
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